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Rule-takers	and	rule-makers:	why	TBTs	are	so	crucial
to	Brexit
At	the	heart	of	the	wrangling	over	Brexit	is	the	question	of	how	much	regulatory
autonomy	the	UK	is	prepared	to	concede	in	exchange	for	access	to	the	Single
Market.	It	is	these	technical	barriers	to	trade	(TBTs)	that	inhibit	countries	from
exporting	to	each	other.	Hayden	Goudy	and	Elisa	Kempe	(LSE)	set	out	what
the	UK	can	realistically	hope	for	and	predict	the	EU	is	unlikely	to	want	(or	need)
to	compromise	on	its	negotiating	line.
The	shape	of	Brexit	may	well	be	in	view.	While	much	is	still	to	be	decided,	the	potential	outcomes	of	the	negotiation
between	the	United	Kingdom	and	the	European	Union	are	already	well	informed	by	a	look	at	the	emergent	technical
barriers	to	trade	in	goods	between	the	parties	and	the	ways	in	which	the	two	could	cooperate	to	mitigate	or	preempt
them	through	regulatory	cooperation.	Any	type	of	post-exit	agreement	between	the	UK	and	the	EU	is	significantly
shaped	by	technical	aspects	of	the	trade	issues	reviewed	here	and	their	implications	for	access	to	the	single-market.
For	the	EU,	defense	of	existing	standards	and	processes	are	key.	For	the	United	Kingdom,	deciding	where	to	fall	in	a
trade-off	between	regulatory	autonomy	and	market	access	will	be	crucial.
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Technical	barriers	to	trade	(TBT)	are	best	defined	as	rules,	regulations	or	standards	which	potentially	hinder	the
cross-border	movement	of	goods.	Trade	barriers	are	more	popularly	understood	as	tariffs,	such	as	the	kind	the
United	States	has	recently	imposed	on	several	of	its	trading	partners.	But	after	decades	of	work	through	the	General
Agreement	on	Tariffs	and	Trade	(GATT)	and	the	World	Trade	Organisation	(WTO),	tariffs	and	quantitative	limits	have
fallen	to	historic	lows.	This	means	that	non-tariff	measures	such	as	TBTs	are	the	most	significant	barriers	to	trade	in
the	modern,	international	economy.
The	WTO’s	Agreement	on	Technical	Barriers	to	Trade	(the	TBT	Agreement)	defines	three	types	of	barrier:
1.	 Technical	regulations
2.	 Standards
3.	 Conformity	assessment	procedures
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States	pass	regulations	and	enforce	standards	to	meet	legitimate	public	safety	and	domestic	policy	goals,	but	these
measures	also	have	the	potential	to	distort	or	inhibit	trade.	Although	designed	to	protect	the	public	interest,	TBTs	can
have	a	severe	effect	on	market	access	and	competitiveness	for	exporters.	Additional	production,	packaging,	or
labelling	requirements	increase	costs	for	exporters	and	reduce	time-to-market.	And	having	multiple	sets	of	standards
tends	to	favor	large	businesses,	who	can	better	afford	compliance	relative	to	small	and	medium	size	enterprises
engaged	in	international	trade.
The	negotiation	between	the	EU	and	the	UK	is	unique	in	that	the	UK	is	currently	in	complete	alignment	with
European	rules	and	regulations.	In	the	short	term,	without	a	negotiated	outcome,	TBTs	will	be	entirely	de	jure.	No
longer	in	the	EU,	UK	based	regulatory	and	certification	bodies	will	lose	the	ability	to	certify	goods	for	frictionless	entry
into	the	single-market,	even	though	regulatory	practices	will	remain	the	same.	In	the	long	term,	as	the	UK	establishes
its	own	regulatory	agenda,	de	facto	barriers,	meaning	substantial	differences	in	regulatory	practices,	could	emerge
unless	addressed	through	ongoing	regulatory	cooperation.	Westminster	will	have	to	decide	on	the	degree	of
regulatory	autonomy	it	wants	to	pursue,	but	there	will	be	consequences	for	access	to	the	European	market	if
standards	move	too	far	apart.	While	there	are	several	options	for	trade	arrangements	between	the	UK	and	EU,	this
tradeoff	means	that	for	regulatory	matters	there	are	three	types	of	post-exit	agreement:
European	Economic	Area	(EEA)	style	membership
a	free	trade	agreement	(FTA)
default	to	WTO	trade	rules
Each	has	unique	consequences	for	the	impact	of	technical	barriers	to	trade,	as	well	as	for	the	mode	of	regulatory
cooperation	between	both	parties.	Broadly,	these	outcomes	are	laid	out	in	Table	1.
Table	1	–	Trade	Outcomes	Post-Brexit	and	their	implications	on	TBTs	and	Regulatory	Cooperation
	 EEA FTA WTO
Costs	of
Technical
Barriers
Negligible Significant(Short	Term) Significant
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Regulatory
Cooperation
Regulatory
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Regulatory
Cooperation
Regulatory
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Membership	of	the	EEA	would	allow	the	UK	to	remain	in	the	single	market	for	goods	and	services	at	the	cost	of	its
own	regulatory	autonomy.	The	EEA	requires	customs	procedures	at	the	border,	which	means	costs	for	exporters.	It
would	also	require	a	certain	degree	of	technical	ingenuity	to	avoid	a	hard	border	for	Northern	Ireland.	But	while	such
an	arrangement	could	result	in	significant	transition	costs,	it	would	preserve	market	access	and	prevent	regulatory
divergence	from	becoming	a	barrier	to	trade.	The	UK	would	become	a	rule	taker,	and	regulatory	cooperation	would
essentially	take	the	form	of	harmonisation	with	EU	rules.	Membership	in	the	Customs	Union	for	trade	in	goods	would
have	much	the	same	effect.
A	free	trade	agreement	(FTA)	between	the	EU	and	the	UK	could	take	several	different	forms.	But	an	FTA	is	likely	to
result	in	a	significant	loss	of	market	access	in	the	short	term	due	to	the	complexity	and	limited	scope	of	certification
procedures	outside	of	the	single	market.	Even	CETA,	the	recent	trade	agreement	between	Canada	and	the	EU,
allows	for	mutual	recognition	of	conformity	assessment	for	only	a	small	set	of	goods.	The	EU	takes	a	conservative
approach	when	recognising	external	regulations,	and	is	unlikely	to	change	its	standard	practice	in	the	context	of
Brexit.
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CETA	is	the	most	comprehensive	agreement	on	TBTs	and	regulatory	cooperation.	It	establishes	the	grounds	for
voluntary	cooperation	in	the	area	of	TBTs	to	“exchange	experiences	and	information”	and	“identify	areas	where	[the
parties]	could	cooperate	more	closely”.	The	protocol	on	the	mutual	acceptance	of	the	results	of	conformity
assessments,	a	critical	step	in	pre-clearing	goods	for	access	to	the	single	market,	is	a	progressive	approach	towards
mutual	recognition	and	the	reduction	of	TBTs.	But	applied	to	the	UK,	CETA	would	mean	a	considerable	loss	of
market	access	and	trade	potential.	Despite	currently	satisfying	EU	requirements,	conformity	assessment	bodies
within	the	UK	would	still	need	formal	approval	from	the	EU,	a	time	intensive	process	lacking	a	clear	criteria,	which
could	restrict	market	access	in	the	short	term	and	disrupt	existing	commercial	relationships.
Over	time,	technical	barriers	to	trade	would	become	more	substantial	if	regulatory	practices	diverged,	but	this	could
be	avoided	if	committed	regulatory	cooperation	became	institutionalised	in	a	FTA.	That	is	contingent	on	clear
procedural	measures	and	a	commitment	from	both	sides	regarding	regulatory	approaches,	an	area	where	the	EU’s
negotiation	position	is	considerably	stronger.	The	EU	is	defending	the	regulatory	status	quo,	and	has	historically	had
an	extremely	high	preference	for	public	safety	standards	over	market	access.	Special	treatment	for	the	UK	would	be
a	departure	from	historical	practice.
A	default	to	WTO	rules	would	result	in	significant	barriers	to	trade	in	both	the	short	and	long	term.	Without	the
cooperative	institutional	approach	that	is	standard	to	European	FTAs,	there	would	be	little	dialogue	on	TBTs	–	for
example	in	committees	and	sectoral	working	groups	on	specific	sectors	–	or	regulatory	cooperation	more	broadly
through	formal	mechanisms	to	determine	mutual	recognition.	This	approach	would	be	the	worst	case	for	market
access,	but	it	would	allow	the	UK	to	pursue	full	regulatory	autonomy.
Other	types	of	trade	arrangements	with	the	EU	could	be	used	as	a	precedent,	but	the	UK’s	goals	and	standard
practice	within	the	EU	are	limiting	factors.	A	customs	union,	endorsed	by	Labour,	would	prohibit	any	type	of	FTA
between	the	UK	and	a	third	party.	This	fails	to	meet	Theresa	May’s	red	line	on	“the	freedom	…	to	negotiate	trade
agreements	with	other	countries	around	the	world.”	And	a	bespoke	FTA	that	allows	deep	market	access	without
disruption	due	to	regulatory	barriers	–	the	so	called	CETA+	type	deal	–	would	be	a	new	and	significant	concession
from	the	EU.	A	robust,	top-down	mutual	recognition	agreement	covering	coveted	sectors	appears	unlikely,
with	Donald	Tusk	stating	that	such	a	“pick-and-mix	approach	for	a	non-member	state	is	out	of	the	question.”
The	loss	in	market	access	resulting	from	regulatory	divergence	could	be	damaging	for	all	trade	in	goods	and
services,.	This	is	why	the	UK	has	emphasised	the	current	close	regulatory	alignment,	mutual	trust	and	willingness	to
cooperate.	Although	the	EU	has	signed	its	willingness	to	discuss	limited	“voluntary	regulatory	cooperation”,	a	broader
framework	of	mutual	recognition	between	the	EU	and	UK	is	highly	unlikely.	Some	experts	argue	the	UK	will	be	a
“rule-taker”	in	trade	in	goods,	but	diverge	from	the	EU’s	regulatory	body	in	services.	Given	the	EU’s	aim	of	a
comprehensive	trade	deal	and	goal	to	prevent	the	UK	from	“cherry-picking”,	this	seems	highly	problematic.
The	UK	is	negotiating	for	a	“top-down”	approach	to	regulatory	cooperation,	opting	out	or	‘de-recognising’	specific
fields	of	trade.	The	EU	is	reluctant	to	give	the	UK	selective	market	access	free	from	a	broad	agreement	on	TBTs	
because	it	wants	to	protect	the	Single	Market	and	preserve	its	negotiating	position	in	other	FTAs.	Since	the	EU’s
regulatory	policy	body	is	strongly	institutionalised	and	change	requires	input	from	27	member	states,	it	will	be	difficult
for	the	UK	to	dictate	regulatory	terms.	With	the	EU	unlikely	to	capitulate,	the	UK	will	have	to	decide	where	the	prize
of	regulatory	autonomy	is	worth	the	costs	to	trade.
This	post	represents	the	views	of	the	authors	and	not	those	of	the	Brexit	blog,	nor	the	LSE.	A	fuller	version	of	this
post	appears	here.
Hayden	Goudy	is	a	masters	student	in	International	Relations	at	LSE.
Elisa	Kempe	is	a	masters	student	in	International	Relations	at	LSE.
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